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Toward Practical Joint Decoding of Binary
Tardos Fingerprinting Codes
Peter Meerwald and Teddy Furon
Abstract—The class of joint decoder in fingerprinting codes is of
utmost importance in theoretical papers to establish the concept
of fingerprint capacity. However, no implementation supporting
a large user base is known to date. This paper presents an itera-
tive decoder which is the first attempt toward practical large-scale
joint decoding. The discriminative feature of the scores benefits
on one hand from the side-information of previously found users,
and on the other hand, from recently introduced universal linear
decoders for compound channels. Neither the code construction
nor the decoder makes assumptions about the collusion size and
strategy, provided it is a memoryless and fair attack. The exten-
sion to incorporate soft outputs from the watermarking layer is
straightforward. An extensive experimental work benchmarks the
very good performance and offers a clear comparison with pre-
vious state-of-the-art decoders.
Index Terms—Compound channel, fingerprinting, Tardos codes,
traitor tracing.
I. INTRODUCTION
T RAITOR tracing or active fingerprinting has witnessed aflurry of research efforts since the invention of the now
well-celebrated Tardos codes [6]. The codes of G. Tardos are
order-optimal in the sense that the code length necessary to
fulfill the following requirements ( users, colluders, proba-
bility of accusing at least one innocent below ) has the min-
imum scaling in .
A first group of papers analyzes such probabilistic finger-
printing codes from the viewpoint of information theory. They
define the worst case attack a collusion of size can produce,
and also the best defense. The main achievement is a saddle
point theorem in the game between the colluders and the
code designer which establishes the concept of fingerprinting
capacity [1]–[4]. Roughly speaking, for a collusion of
maximum size , the maximum number of users exponentially
grows with with an exponent equal to to guarantee
vanishing probabilities of error asymptotically as the code
length increases.
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Our point of view is much more practical and signal
processing oriented. In traitor tracing applications distinct
codewords of bits have been hidden in distributed copies
with an appropriate watermarking technique. It implies that we
have no choice on as it depends on the content size and the
watermarking embedding rate. Each embedded codeword links
a copy of the content to a particular user. The total number
of users may not be known in advance like, for instance, in a
Video-on-Demand application where clients buy content se-
quentially. However, at the time a pirated version is discovered,
we know that the content has been distributed to users so far.
Our goal is to identify some colluders under the strict require-
ment that the probability of accusing innocents is below . It
is clear that we are not in an asymptotic setup since and
are fixed. The encoder and the decoder are not informed of the
collusion size and its attack, therefore there is no clue whether
the actual rate is indeed below capacity
. After reviewing the construction of Tardos codes and the
collusion attack, Section II summarizes important elements of
information theory as guidelines for the design of our decoder.
It motivates the use of joint decoding, which computes a score
per subset of users, as opposed to a single decoder computing
a score per user.
A second group of related researchworks deals with decoding
algorithms. As far as a practical implementation of joint de-
coding is concerned, the literature is very scarce. Amiri pro-
poses a pair decoder tractable on a short list of suspects [7,
sec. 5.3]. The idea is proven to be theoretically well grounded
against two colluders. However, the sorting is in terms of Ham-
ming distance from the pirated sequence, which seems to be
quite an ad hoc choice; no experimental work is conducted.
Nuida also proposes a provably secure joint decoder against
three colluders whose runtime is longer than one hour for a very
small setup [8].
For a single as well as a joint decoder, a primary challenge
is to compute scores that are as discriminative as possible. The
earliest decoders proposed in the literature are single decoders
not adapting the score computation to the collusion strategy
[6], [9]. They rely on an invariance property where, whatever
the collusion process under the marking assumption, the sta-
tistics of scores of the innocents and the colluders are almost
fixed and sufficiently discriminative if the code is long enough.
Being inspired by a recent paper on compound channel theory
[5], we first propose a generalized linear single decoder which
is more discriminative but at the cost of higher complexity. A
second approach in the literature aims at first identifying the
collusion process, and then at computing more discriminative
scores for this specific attack [10]. However, the identifiability
1556-6013/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE
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of the attack is a crucial issue when the number of colluders is
not known. Again, the application of the concepts from [5] al-
lows us to get inferences about the attack sufficient for deriving
highly discriminative scores while avoiding a complete identifi-
cation of the attack channel. Section III sums up these two fam-
ilies of single decoders and the way we have improved them.
A further difficulty in traitor tracing schemes is the thresh-
olding of the scores to reliably accuse users who are part of
the collusion. The value of the threshold is easily set when
the statistics of the scores are known, which is the case when
the above-mentioned invariance property holds. However, for
a general scoring function, these statistics depend on the collu-
sion process which is not known. Section III-C presents a simple
idea: there are plenty of codewords which have not been dis-
tributed to users. Therefore, it is possible to use them as instan-
tiations of the codeword of an innocent. We propose to estimate
the threshold yielding the required probability of false alarm
with a rare event estimator.
Section IV focuses on the architecture of our joint decoder
based on three primitives: channel inference, score computa-
tion, and thresholding. Its iterative nature stems from two ideas.
First, the codeword of a newly accused user is integrated as a
side information for the next iterations and enables more dis-
criminative score computation. This idea was already imple-
mented for fingerprinting codes based on error correcting codes
[11]. We present a way to implement it for Tardos codes by con-
ditioning the probabilities used in the score function. The second
idea is joint decoding based on the channel inference.
A last difficulty is to have a fast implementation of the ac-
cusation algorithm when facing a large-scale user set. A main
advantage of some fingerprinting schemes based on error-cor-
recting codes is to offer an accusation procedure with runtime
polynomial in [11], [12]. In comparison, the well-known
Tardos-Škoric single decoder is based on an exhaustive search
which has complexity [6], [9]. Since in theory can
asymptotically be in the order of , decoding of Tardos codes
might be intractable. Again, we do not consider such a theo-
retical setup, but we pay attention to maintain an affordable
decoding complexity for orders of magnitude met in practical
applications. Compared to prior art of joint decoding [7], [8],
our algorithm considers user subsets of bigger size, manages
large scale setups, and is faster. Its iterative nature maintains a
tractable complexity because users that are unlikely to be guilty
are pruned out at each step.
Section V presents our experimental investigations. The
first part relies on the marking assumption and compares code
lengths with [13]. This reference reaches very small lengths
thanks to a particular choice of Gauss-Legendre distribution,
but assuming the collusion size is known at the Tardos code
construction. It is interesting to see that our decoder obtains
competitive lengths while keeping the original code construc-
tion. The second part uses the soft outputs of a watermarking
decoder as tested with the Tardos code in [14] and with the
error correction code (ECC)-based fingerprinting code in [15]
and [16]. The number of users ranges from 10 to more than
10 . This latter impressive setup comes from [16] where the
authors manage such a large number of users thanks to list
decoding of ECC-based fingerprinting. As far as we know, our
paper presents for the first time experimental results on such
a large scale for the Tardos code. Soft watermark decoding
achieves tangible performance enhancements contrary to the
conclusions drawn in [14]. Overall, the comparisons to related
works with their exact setup show the benefits of our decoder:
better decoding performance with a controlled probability of
false alarm and an acceptable runtime.
II. TARDOS CODE AND COLLUSION MODEL
We briefly review the construction and some well-known
facts about Tardos codes.
A. Construction
The binary code is composed of codewords of bits. The
codeword identifying user
, where , is composed of bi-
nary symbols independently drawn at the code construction s.t.
, . At initialization, the auxil-
iary variables are independent and identically drawn
according to distribution . This distribution
is a parameter which is public. Tardos originally proposed in
[6] for where is
the cutoff parameter. Both the code and the
auxiliary sequence must be kept as secret
parameters.
B. Collusion Attack Over Code Symbols
The collusion attack or collusion channel describes the way
the colluders merge their binary codewords
to forge the binary pirated sequence . We restrict
our attention to a memoryless multiple access channel, which
is fair in the sense that all colluders participate equally in the
forgery. This assumption is widely used, and justified theoreti-
cally [1, sec. 3.2] (in terms of capacity, i.e., asymptotically with
the code length) when the secret key is only shared between en-
coder and decoder: The colluders know neither the codeword
of any other user, nor the distribution of the codewords. This is
the case for a Tardos code because is secret. Moreover, iden-
tifying all the colluders is hopeless (c.f. detect-all scenario, see
Section II-D) if the attack is not fair because some colluders
might be almost idle [1, lemma 3.2].
This leads to a probability transition ma-
trix where is the random variable
counting the number of “1” symbols the colluders received out
of symbols. A common parameter of the collusion attack on
binary codes is denoted by the vector
with . The usual working as-
sumption, so-called marking assumption [17], imposes that
. The set of collusion attacks that
colluders can lead under the marking assumption is denoted by
(1)
Examples of attacks following this model are given, for in-
stance, in [10]. The remainder of the paper assumes this col-
lusion model, except for the simulations on real samples over
an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel which are
based on the extension presented as follows.
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C. Collusion Attack Over Real Samples
The marking assumption is an unrealistic restriction for
traitor tracing with multimedia content as the colluders are not
limited to the copy-and-paste strategy for each symbol as de-
scribed in the previous section. They can merge the samples of
their content versions (audio samples, pixels, DCT coefficients,
etc.) in addition to traditional attempts to compromise the
watermark. This may result in erroneously decoded symbols or
erasures from the watermarking layer. Relaxing the marking
assumption leads to two approaches. In the combined digit
model assumed in [18] and [19], the watermark decoder is
indeed composed of multiple binary detectors, one per symbol
of the alphabets: for the binary alphabet, both symbols may be
detected in case of a merge. In [14] and [15], the watermark
decoder has a single but scalar output . In brief, this soft de-
cision is clearly negative (positive) if symbol “0” (respectively
“1”) is detected, and around 0 in case of a merge. This section
extends the model of collusion to this latter approach, replacing
the probability transition matrix by
probability density functions .
It is challenging if not impossible to exhibit a model encom-
passing all the merging attacks while being relevant for a ma-
jority of watermarking techniques. Our approach is pragmatic.
The sequence is extracted from the pirated copy such
that if the signal is perfectly watermarked with
binary symbol . To reflect the merging attack, the colluders
forge values and add noise:
with . This would be the case, as sketched in
the left part of Fig. 3, for a spread spectrumwatermarking where
a symbol is embedded per block of content with an antipodal
[a.k.a. binary phase shift keying (BPSK)] modulation of a se-
cret carrier [14], [16].
The colluders have two strategies to agree on . In the first
strategy, they collude according to the marking assumption (i.e.,
they copy-and-paste one of their blocks of samples) and add
noise: and the probability that is given by
the components of . This gives the following pdf:
(2)
Except for , the pdfs have a priori two modes (hence
the superscript ). This model is parameterized by .
In the second strategy, the colluders select
s.t. the pdf is as follows:
(3)
An equivalent of the marking assumption would impose that
and . The pdfs have a unique mode (hence
the superscript ). This model is parameterized by .
Fig. 1 gives some examples of such pdfs.
We use these extended models for collusion inference in
Section V-B to show how our algorithm can handle the soft
outputs of a watermarking decoder.
Fig. 1. Examples of pdf for the models with : (top) two
modes [ ; see (2)] with (solid) interleaving attack and (dashed)
the coin-flip attack ( for ). (bottom) One mode [ ; see
(3)] with (solid) averaging attack and (dashed) set to 0
attack ( for ).
D. Accusation
Denote the set of users accused by the decoder. The
probability of false positive is defined by . In
practice, a major requirement is to control this feature so that it
is lower than a given significance level.
In a detect-one scenario, is either a singleton or the empty
set. A good decoder has a low probability of false negative de-
fined by . In a detect-many scenario, several
users are accused, and a possible figure of merit is the number
of caught colluders: . In the literature, there exists a third
scenario, so-called detect-all, where a false negative happens if
at least one colluder is missed. This paper only considers the
first two scenarios.
E. Guidelines From Information Theory
This paper does not pretend to make any new theoretical con-
tribution, but presents some recent elements to stress guidelines
when designing our practical decoder.
A single decoder computes a score per user. It accuses
users whose score is above a threshold (detect-many sce-
nario) or the user with the biggest score above the threshold
(detect-one scenario). Under both scenarios and provided
that the collusion is fair, the performance of such de-
coders is theoretically bounded by the achievable rate
. A
fundamental result is that, for a given collusion size , there
exists an equilibrium to the max-min game between
the colluders (who select ) and the code designer (who selects
) as defined by in [22, th. 4].
A joint decoder computes a score per subset of
users and accuses the users belonging to subsets whose
score is above a threshold or only the most likely guilty
amongst these users. Under both scenarios and provided
that the collusion is fair, the performance of such de-
coders is theoretically bounded by the achievable rate
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.
The random variable denotes the sum of the subset user
symbols. Moreover, for a given collusion size , there also
exists an equilibrium to the max-min game
[2, th. 4].
Yet, the code designer needs to bet on a collusion size in
order to use the optimal distribution (or if the decoder
is joint).
Asymptotically, as , both and
quickly approach the equilibrium value of the
respective max-min game [2, Fig. 2]. Huang andMoulin proved
converges to , the distribution originally proposed by
Tardos [2, cor. 7].
Despite the division by in the expression of , it ap-
pears that [1, eq. (3.4)]. This tells us
that a joint decoder is theoretically more powerful than a single
decoder. However, a joint decoder needs to compute
scores since there are subsets of size . This complexity
is absolutely intractable for large-scale applications even for
a small . This explains why, so far, joint decoders were only
considered theoretically to derive fingerprinting capacity. Our
idea is that there is no need to consider all these subsets since a
vast majority is only composed of innocent users. Our decoder
iteratively prunes out users deemed as innocents and considers
the subsets over the small set of remaining suspects.
This iterative strategy results in a decoder which is a mix of
single and joint decoding. Unfortunately, it prevents us from
taking advantage of the game theory theorems mentioned pre-
viously. We cannot find the optimal distribution and the worst
collusion attack against our decoder. Nevertheless, our decoder
works with any distribution under the conditions stated in
Section III. For all these reasons, the experiments of Section IV
are done with the most common Tardos distribution .
Fernandez and Soriano proposed an iterative accusation
process of an error correcting code based fingerprinting
scheme [11]. Each iteration takes advantage of the codewords
of colluders already identified in the previous iterations.
The same idea is possible with Tardos fingerprinting code.
This is justified by the fact that the side information ,
defined as the random variable sum of the already iden-
tified colluder symbols, increases the mutual information:
. Indeed, side information
helps more than joint decoding as proved by [1, eq. (3.3)].
The guidelines can be summarized as follows: use the contin-
uous Tardos distribution for code construction, integrate the
codewords of already identified colluders as side information,
and finally use a joint decoder on a short list of suspects.
III. SINGLE DECODER BASED ON COMPOUND CHANNEL
THEORY AND RARE EVENT ANALYSIS
This section first reviews some single decoders and presents
new decoders based on compound channel theory and rare event
analysis. The first difficulty is to compute a score per user such
that the colluders are statistically well separated from the inno-
cents scores. The second difficulty is to set a practical threshold
such that the probability of false positive is under control.
Detection theory tells us that the score given by the log-like-
lihood ratio (LLR)
(4)
is optimally discriminative in the Neyman-Pearson sense to de-
cide the guiltiness of user . For the sake of a lighter expression,
we omit the dependence of the involved probabilities on
(see their computation in Section IV-B). Yet, the LLR needs the
knowledge of the true collusion attack which prevents the use
of this optimal single decoder in practical settings. Some papers
proposed a so-called “Learn and Match” strategy using the LLR
score tuned on an estimation of the attack channel [10]. Un-
fortunately, a lack of identifiability obstructs a direct estimation
from (see Section III-B). Indeed, the estimation is sound
only if is known, and if the number of different values taken by
is bigger than1 or equal to . This is because
is a polynomial in of degree at most (see (16) with
and ) going from point to , and we need
more points to uniquely identify this polynomial. To overcome
this lack of information about , an expectation-maximization
(E.-M.) approach has been proposed in [10]. Yet, it is not sat-
isfactory since it does not scale well with the number of users.
Moreover, the setting of the threshold was not addressed.
On the other hand, there are decoders that do not adapt their
score computation to the collusion. This is the case of the score
computation originally proposed by Tardos [6], and later on im-
proved by Škoric et al. [9]. It relies on an invariance property:
the statistics of the scores, up to the second order, do not depend
on the collusion attack channel , but only on the collusion size
[20]. Thanks to this invariance w.r.t. the collusion attack, there
exists a threshold guaranteeing a probability of false positive
below while keeping the false negative away from 1 pro-
vided that the code is long enough, i.e., .
However, there is a price to pay: the scores are clearly less dis-
criminative than the LLR.
Some theoretical papers [21, sec. V], [1, sec. 5.2] promote
another criterion, so-called “universality”, for the design of de-
coders. The performance (usually evaluated as the achievable
rate or the error exponent) when facing a collusion channel
should not be lower than the performance against the worst at-
tack . In a sense, it sends a warning to the “Learn and Match”
strategy. Suppose that and that, for some reasons, the
estimation of the collusion attack is of poor quality. In any case,
a mismatch between and should not ruin the performance of
the decoder to the point it is even lower than what is achievable
under the worst attack . The previously cited [1], [21] recom-
mend the single universal decoder based on the empirical mu-
tual information (or empirical equivocation for joint
decoder). The setting of the threshold depends on the desired
error exponent of the false positive rate. Therefore, it is valid
only asymptotically.
To summarize, there have been two approaches: adaptation or
nonadaptation to the collusion process. The first class is not very
well grounded since the identifiability of the collusion attack is
an issue and the impact of a mismatch has not been studied. The
1This is the case in this paper since we opt for the continuous Tardos distri-
bution .
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second approach is more reliable, but with a loss of discrimi-
nation power compared to the optimal LLR. The next sections
present two new decoders belonging to both approaches based
on the compound channel theory.
A. Some Elements on Compound Channels
Recently, in the setup of digital communication through
compound channels, Abbe and Zheng [5] proposed universal
decoders which are linear, i.e., in essence very simple. This
section summarizes this theory and the next one proposes two
applications for Tardos single decoders. A compound channel
is a set of channels, here discrete memoryless channels
defined by their probability transition matrix
parameterized by . The encoder
shares a code book with the decoder.
Its construction is assumed to be a random code realization
from a provably good mass distribution . After receiving
a channel output , the decoder computes a score per
codeword , and yields the message associated with
the codeword with the biggest score. The decoder is linear if
the score has the following structure:
(5)
with . For instance, score (4), so-called
MAP decoder in digital communications [5], is linear with
. However, in the compound
channel setup, the decoder does not know through which
channel of the codeword has been transmitted, and therefore
it cannot rely on the MAP.
We are especially interested in two results. First, if is
one-sided with respect to the input distribution (see Defini-
tion 1 as follows), then the MAP decoder tuned on the worst
channel is a linear universal decoder [5, lemma 5]. If
with finite and one-sided w.r.t. the input
distribution , then the following generalized linear
decoder is universal [5, th. 1] where the score of a codeword is
the maximum of the MAP scores tuned on the worst channel
of each
(6)
Definition 1 (One-Sided Set of [5, Def. 3]): A set is one-
sided with respect to an input distribution if:
1) the following minimizer is unique:
(7)
with the mutual information with
(where denotes the joint distri-
bution with the distribution of and the conditional
distribution), and the closure of ;
2)
(8)
with the Kullback-Leibler distance, the mar-
ginal of induced by , and the product
of the marginals.
B. Application to Single Tardos Decoders
Contrary to the code construction phase, it is less critical at
the decoding side to presume that the real collusion size is
less than or equal to a given parameter . This parameter can
be set to the largest number of colluders the fingerprinting code
can handle with a reasonable error probability knowing .
Another argument is that this assumption is not definitive. If
the decoding fails because the assumption does not hold true,
nothing prevents us from relaunching decoding with a bigger
. Let us assume in the sequel.
1) Nonadaption to Collusion Process: A first guideline
inspired from the work [5] is straightforward: The collusion
channel belongs to the set as defined in (1), and
thanks to [5, lemma 4] each convex set is one-sided w.r.t.
any distribution . According to [5, th. 1], the decoder should
then be a generalized linear decoder
(9)
where . This
decoder does not adapt its score computation to the collusion
attack.
2) Adaption to Collusion Process: The second idea inspired
from the work [5] is more involved as the lack of identifiability
turns to our advantage. The true collusion channel has gen-
erated data distributed as . Let us define the class
.
From [22, prop. 3], we know that is not restricted to
the singleton because for any there exists one
. This is true especially for . Asymp-
totically with the code length, the consistent maximum likeli-
hood estimator (MLE) parameterized on , as defined in (18),
yields an estimation with increasing ac-
curacy. This is not an estimation of the true collusion attack be-
cause a priori. Therefore, we prefer to refer to
as a collusion inference, and the scoring uses this inference as
follows:
(10)
Suppose that the MLE tuned on provides a perfect in-
ference , we then succeed to restrict the compound
channel to the discrete set which we define as the re-
striction of to collusions of size . Appendix A
shows that is one-sided w.r.t. , and its worst
attack is indeed . In [5, lemma 5] the authors justify the use
of the MAP decoder (4) tuned on . Its application leads to a
more efficient decoder since .
This decoder pertains to the approach based on score adaptation,
with noticeable advantages: it is better theoretically grounded
and it is far less complex than the iterative E.-M. decoder of
[10].
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Fig. 2. DET plot for several decoders; , , . Single
(MI) is the decoder based on empirical mutual information [1], Single (Com-
pound) relates to (9), Single (MAP) is (4), Single is the LLR on (10), and
Symm. Tardos is the symmetric version of Tardos scores proposed by Škoric et
al. in [9]: (a) Worst case attack and (b) Majority attack.
Fig. 2 illustrates the detection error tradeoff (DET) per user
for the single decoders discussed so far with and
colluders performing worst case (i.e., minimizing
over ) and majority attack . For
this figure, the false positive and the false negative
probabilities are defined per user as follows:
(11)
(12)
where is a random variable denoting the codeword of an
innocent user and , the codeword of the first colluder. The
single decoder is tuned on the collusion inference (with
) and performs almost as well as the MAP decoder
having knowledge of . The DET of the symmetric Tardos score
is invariant w.r.t. the collusion attack. The generalized linear
decoder of (9) denoted compound takes little advantage of the
fact that themajority attack is muchmilder than the worst attack.
For a fair comparison, the single decoder based on the empirical
mutual information [1] assumes a Tardos distribution uniformly
quantized to 10 bins; better results (yet still below the single
decoder) can be obtained when tuned to the optimal discrete
distribution for colluders [23].
The similarities between compound channel and finger-
printing has been our main inspiration, however some differ-
ences prevent any claim of optimality. First, in the compound
channel problem, there is a unique codeword that has been
transmitted, whereas in fingerprinting, is forged from
codewords like in a multiple access channel. Therefore, the
derived single decoders are provably good for tracing a given
colluder (detect-one scenario), but they might not be the best
when looking for more colluders (detect-many scenario). The
second difference is that the decoder should sometimes refuse
to accuse any user to reduce the possibility of falsely accusing
innocent users. The setting of a threshold is clearly missing for
the moment.
C. Setting Threshold With Rare Event Analysis
This section explains how we set a threshold in accordance
with the required thanks to a rare event analysis. Our ap-
proach is very different than [1], [3], [6], and [21] where a
theoretical development either finds a general threshold suit-
able when facing a collusion of size , or equivalently, where
it claims a reliable decision when the rate is below the capacity
which depends on . Simone and Škoric recently made a pre-
cise analysis of the pdf of the score of an innocent user [24],
but it needs the collusion attack channel . Neither nor is
needed in our threshold estimation, but it only holds for a given
couple and a known . Once these are fixed, the score
is a deterministic function from to .
Since the codewords of the innocent users are i.i.d. and ,
we have
(13)
The number of possible codewords can be evaluated as the
number of typical sequences, i.e., in the order of ,
with the entropy in bits of a Bernoulli random variable
. bits, which leads to a far bigger
number of typical sequences than (say and
in practice). This shows that plenty of codewords have not been
created when a pirate copy is found. Therefore, we consider
them as occurrences of since we are sure that they have not
participated in the forgery of . The idea is then to estimate
s.t. with, for instance, a Monte
Carlo simulation with newly created codewords.
The difficulty lies in the order of magnitude. Some typical
requirements are and , hence an estima-
tion of corresponding to a probability as small as .
This is not tractable with a basic Monte Carlo on a regular com-
puter because it requires runs. However, the new esti-
mator based on rare event analysis proposed in [25] performs
remarkably fast within this range of magnitude. It produces
and a % confidence interval2 with only
runs. In our decoder, we compare the scores to (i.e., a pes-
simistic estimate of ) to ensure a total false positive probability
lower than . Last but not least, this approach works for any
deterministic scoring function and is also applied to joint
decoding in Section IV-C.
IV. ITERATIVE, JOINT DECODING ALGORITHM
This section extends the single decoder based on the collusion
inference toward joint decoding, according to the guide-
lines of Section II-E. Preliminary results about these key ideas
were first presented in [26] and [27]. The description as follows
makes references to the lines of the pseudo-code of Algorithm 1.
2In practice, we set , i.e., we are 95% sure that the true lies in this
interval.
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A. Architecture
The first principle is to iterate the score computation and in-
clude users accused in previous iterations as side-information to
build a more discriminative test. Let denote the initially
empty set of accused users (line 1). In each iteration we aim at
identifying a (possibly empty) set of users (lines 8 and 20)
and then update with (line 24).
Second, we additionally compute scores for subsets of users
of , (line 13). There are such sub-
sets. As is large, enumerating and computing a score for each
subset is intractable even for small . The idea here is to find a
restricted set of users (line 11) that
are the most likely to be guilty and to keep approx-
imately constant from one iteration to another and within our
computation resources.We gradually reduce by pruning out
users who are unlikely to have taken part in the collusion when
going from single decoding to pair decoding,
etc. If , then score computation of -subsets over
the restricted user set is within just like for the single de-
coder. By abuse of notation, denotes the set of all -sub-
sets of (line 13).
Initially, the single decoder computes the score of all users
(line 6) and accuses those whose score is above the estimated
threshold (line 8). If this happens, these users are included
in (line 24), and the single decoder restarts by better esti-
mating the collusion inference and computing more discrimi-
native scores thanks to the side-information. If nobody is ac-
cused, we rank the users according to their “single” score, i.e.,
the top-ranked user is most likely to be a colluder, and only
the first users are included in . This list of suspects
is passed to the joint decoder for , i.e., a pair decoder.
The joint decoder produces a new list of scores computed
from subsets of users (line 13), which—according to theo-
retical results [1], [3]—are more discriminative as increases.
Yet, the accusation and the pruning operations at this stage are
more involved than with the single decoder. Denote
the -subset of users with the highest score (line 15). If this
score is above the threshold, the joint decoder tries to accuse the
most likely colluder within (lines 17–21; see Section IV-C).
Therefore, at most one user is accused at this step (contrary to
the single decoder, which may accuse more than one user). If
this happens, is updated (line 24), and the single decoder
restarts taking into account this new side-information. If no ac-
cusation can be made by the joint -subset decoder, we generate
a new and shorter list of suspects based on the ranking
of joint scores (line 11) that is fed to the subsequent joint
decoding stage (see Section IV-C).
In the detect-one scenario, the algorithm stops after the first
accusation.We restrict the subset size to , with .
This is not a severe limitation as for moderately large , the
decoding performance advantage of the joint decoder quickly
vanishes [1]. In the detect-many scenario, iteration stops when
or reaches and no further
accusation can be made. The set then contains the user in-
dices to be accused. Algorithm 1 gives the architecture of the
accusation process for the catch-many scenario.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Joint Tardos Decoder



























The next sections describe the score computation, the pruning
and the accusation, and the inference of the collusion process in
more detail.
B. Score Computation
This section extends the scoring (10) of the single decoder
to joint decoding. Denote by the set of codewords of the
users of set . For a -subset , the accusation is formulated
as a hypothesis test based on the observations and
on the side-information to decide between (all
are innocent) and (all are guilty). The joint score
of subset , , is just the LLR tuned
on the inference of the collusion process. This description
encompasses single scores (10) for (lines 6 and 20) and
joint scores for (line 13). In the latter case, the alternative
hypothesis should indeed be: there is at least one who
is guilty. But this composite hypothesis test has a complexity in
per -subset. Our approach is suboptimal for but
less complex.
The sequences , and the codewords of the codebook are
composed of independent random variables thanks to the code
construction and the memoryless nature of the collusion. More-
over, the collusion only depends on the number of “1” sym-
bols present in the codewords of a subset. Denote by and
the accumulated codewords corresponding to and :
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and . We have ,
and , where . Thanks to the linear
structure of the decoder, the score for a subset of users is
simply
(14)
where is the entry in row and column of a
weight matrix which is precomputed (procedure
weights in Algorithm 1) from taking into account the
side information so that
(15)
For indices s.t. , both the numerator and the denomi-
nator share a generic formula,
and , respectively, with
(16)
In words, this expression gives the probability that
knowing that the symbol “1” has been distributed to users with
probability , the collusion model , and the identity of
colluders who have symbols “1” and symbols “0”. For
indices s.t. in (15), the numerator and the denominator
need to be “mirrored”: .
At iterations based on the single decoder (lines 6 and 20),
and for user . If nobody has been deemed guilty
so far, then . This score is defined
if . Therefore, for a given size of side-informa-
tion, we cannot conceive a score for subsets of size bigger than
. This implies that in the detect-many scenario, the
maximal number of iterations depends on how fast grows.
The procedure scores in Algorithm 1 outputs a list of scores
given a set of subsets of users (which is the set of users if
for single decoding), the code matrix and the weight matrix .
We assume there is a deterministic way to browse all the -sub-
sets; in practice, this is done by the revolving door procedure
[27].
C. Ranking Users and Accusation
In order to built the set , we need to rank the users based
on the previous scores.We record the highest score for each user
(17)
This step is not needed if the scores come from a single de-
coder. The procedure top (line 11) ranks users according to
their highest subset score and prunes the suspect list to the first
users.
Suppose is a -subset composed of innocent users. Using
rare event analysis, is a pessimistic estimation of (see
Section III-C) s.t. .
This is the procedure threshold applied with
(lines 7 and 19) or (line 14). Let denote the
-subset with the highest score (line 15). If , then
contains at least one colluder with a high probability. This works
for any scoring function, and especially with the one explained
in Section IV-B even if it is not optimal.
We accuse at most one user in . We compute the
following single score: , and
we accuse user if it is bigger than , with s.t.
(line 19).
This method is suggested in [1, sec. 5.3]. The order in which
we screen the users of has little importance. In practice,
we focus on the users appearing more frequently in the highest
subsets of (17).
D. Inference of Collusion Process
The MLE infers about the collusion process (line 4)
(18)
Whenever a user is deemed guilty, the user is added to side-
information and we rerun the parameter estimation to refine the
collusion inference. Our soft decision decoding method resorts
to the noise-aware collusion models (2) and (3) and sets
(19)
This is illustrated in the right part of Fig. 3. Notice that models
and share the same number of parameters, therefore, there
is no risk of overfitting. Replacing (18) by (19) in the collusion
inference step is the only change to the decoding algorithms we
make to handle collusion attacks over real samples.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented the Tardos decoders in C .3 Single
and joint score computation is implemented efficiently using
precomputed lookup tables, c.f. (14) and (15) and aggregation
techniques described in [26]. For a code length of
more than 10 single and about 10 joint scores, respectively,
can be computed per second on a single core of a regular Intel
Core2~2.6 GHz CPU. To control the runtime, the joint decoders
are confined to 5-subset decoding and around
computed subsets per joint decoding stage. An iterative
decoding experiment can be executed on a PCwithin a couple of
minutes, given enough memory, see [27] for details. To exper-
imentally verify the false-positive rate controlled by rare-event
analysis, up to tests per parameter setting have been per-
formed on a cluster of PCs.
First, we compare the performance of the proposed decoders
under marking assumption. Finally, we lift this unrealistic re-
striction and turn to a more practical assessment using soft-de-
cision decoding.
Unless explicitly noted, the terms single and joint decoder
refer to the decoders conditioned on the inference of the col-
lusion process , c.f. (10) and (14). Further, we consider
3Source code is available at http://www.irisa.fr/texmex/people/furon/src.
html.
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Fig. 3. Attack channel and collusion model inference.
Fig. 4. Code length versus for users and different number of
colluders performing worst case attack against a single decoder; .
the MAP decoders assuming knowledge of and the com-
pound channel decoder, c.f. (9), tuned on the worst case attack
, . As a baseline for a performance com-
parison, we always include symmetric Tardos score computa-
tion [9] with a threshold controlled by rare-event analysis (see
Section III-C).
A. Decoding Performance Under Marking Assumption
1) Detect-One Scenario: Here, the aim is to catch at most
one colluder—this is the tracing scenario most commonly con-
sidered in the literature. We compare our single and joint de-
coder performance against the results provided by Nuida et al.
[13] (which are the best as far as we know) and, as a second ref-
erence, the symmetric Tardos decoder.
The experimental setup considers users and
colluders performing worst case attack
[22] against a single decoder. In Fig. 4, we plot the empirical
probability of error obtained by running 10
experiments for each setting versus the code length . The
false-positive error is controlled by thresholding based on
rare-event simulation, , which is confirmed exper-
imentally. Evidently, for a given probability of error, the joint
decoder succeeds in reducing the required code length over the
single decoder, especially for larger collusions.
Table I compares the code length to obtain an error rate of
for our proposed Tardos decoders and the sym-
metric Tardos decoder with the results reported by Nuida et al.
[13, Table 4] under marking assumption. Except for , the
proposed decoders can substantially reduce the required code
length and the joint decoder improves the results of the single
decoder. Note that Nuida’s results give analytic code length as-
suming a particular number of colluders for constructing the
TABLE I
CODE LENGTH COMPARISON FOR DETECT-ONE SCENARIO: , WORST
CASE ATTACK AGAINST A SINGLE DECODER,
code but the collusion attack is arbitrary (i.e., not necessary fair)
whereas our results are experimental estimates based on worst
case attack against a single decoder and without knowing at
the code construction. Results with known are provided in [27]
and show a slightly better performance: the required code length
of the joint decoder is then slightly shorter than Nuida’s code in
case .
2) Detect-Many Scenario: We now consider the more real-
istic case where the code length is fixed and the false-negative
error rate is only a minor concern4 while the false-positive prob-
ability is critical to avoid an accusation of an innocent. The aim
is to identify as many colluders as possible.
Fig. 5(a) and (b) shows the average number of identified
colluders by different decoding approaches. The experimental
setup considers users, code length , and
several collusion attacks (worst case, i.e., minimizing the
achievable rate of a single or joint decoder, interleaving and
majority which is a rather mild attack) carried out by two to
eight colluders. The global probability of a false positive error
is fixed to .
As expected, the MAP single decoder knowing provides
the best decoding performance among the single decoders, yet
is unobtainable in practice. The symmetric Tardos decoder per-
forms poorly but evenly against all attacks; the single decoder
based on the compound channel (9) improves the results only
slightly.
The joint decoders consistently achieve to identify most col-
luders—with a dramatic margin in case the traitors choose the
worst case attack against a single decoder. This attack bothers
the very first step of our decoder, but as soon as some side infor-
mation is available or a joint decoder is used, this is no longer
the worst case attack. Finding the worst case attack against our
iterative decoder is indeed difficult. A good guess is the inter-
leaving attack which is asymptotically the worst case against
the joint decoder [2]. The experiments show that it reduces the
performance of the joint decoders substantially for large .
4A tracing scheme rightly accusing a colluder half of the time might be
enough to dissuade dishonest users.
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Fig. 5. Decoder comparison in detect-many tracing scenario: ,
, , . (Best viewed in color.) (a) Worst case attack
against single decoder. (b) Worst case attack against joint decoder. (c) Inter-
leaving attack. (d) Majority attack.
The decoder based on the inference and the true MAP
are different when is lower than . However, this is not a
great concern in practice for a fixed : for small , the code
is long enough to face the collusion even if the score is less
discriminative than the ideal MAP; for big the score of our
decoder gets closer to the ideal MAP.
B. Decoding Performance of Soft Decoder
We assess the performance of the soft decision decoders pro-
posed in Section II-C in two tracing scenarios: i) Kuribayashi
considers in [14] users and code length ;
and ii) a large-scale setup with 33 554 432 users and
where Jourdas and Moulin [16] provide results for their high-
rate random-like fingerprinting code under averaging and inter-
leaving attack.
In Fig. 6, we compare the average number of identified col-
luders for the single and joint decoder using different estimates
of the collusion process. A simple approach, termed hard de-
cision decoding in the sequel, first thresholds (to quantize
into 0 if and 1 otherwise), and then employs
the collusion process inference of (18) on the hard out-
puts. The term soft relates to the noise-aware decoders relying
on or chosen adaptively based on the likelihood of
the two models [see (19)]. All plots also show the results for the
(hard-thresholding) symmetric Tardos decoder. The false-posi-
tive rate is set to 10 . Extensive experiments ( test runs)
have been carried out to validate the accusation threshold ob-
tained by rare-event simulation. As expected, soft decoding of-
fers substantial gains in decoding performance. The margin be-
tween the single and joint decoders depends on the collusion
strategy. Dramatic improvements can be seen when the collu-
sion chooses the worst case attack against a single decoder, c.f.
Fig. 6(a). On the other hand, the gain is negligible when aver-
aging is performed.
Note that the attacks in (a)–(c) pertain to the copy-and-paste
attacks while Fig. 6(d) shows the linear averaging attack.
Comparison with the results provided in [14] for the majority
attack is difficult: 1) they were obtained for Nuida’s discrete
code construction [13] tuned on colluders and 2) the
false-positive rate of [14] does not seem to be under control for
the symmetric Tardos code. We suggest using the hard sym-
metric Tardos decoder [9] as a baseline for performance com-
parison. By replacing the accusation thresholds proposed in [14]
with a rare-event simulation, we are able to fix the false-alarm
rate in case of the symmetric Tardos code. Furthermore, the de-
coding results given in [14] for the discrete variant of the fin-
gerprinting code (i.e., Nuida’s construction) could be signifi-
cantly improved by rare-event simulation-based thresholding.
Contrary to the claim of [14], soft decision decoding always pro-
vides a performance benefit over the hard decoders.
In Fig. 7 we illustrate the decoding performance when dealing
with a large user base. We consider averaging and interleaving
attacks by and colluders (
and , respectively) followed by AWGN with variance
. The global false-positive rate is set to 10 . The benefit
of the soft decoding approach is clearly evident. Joint decoding
provides only a very limited increase in the number of identified
colluders. For comparison, Jourdas andMoulin indicate an error
rate of for colluders in the first, and
for colluders in the second setting for a detect-one
scenario [16].
In [28], and are given for the
first experiment [Fig. 7(a)] by introducing a threshold to control
the false-positive rate. Our soft joint decoder achieves a
for (for colluders), catching 2.6
traitors on average.
In the second experiment [see Fig. 7(b)], our joint decoder
compares more favorably: with the given code length, all
colluders can be identified and for a collusion size ,
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Fig. 6. Kuribayashi setup: , , , ,
; worst case, interleaving, majority and averaging attack followed
by AWGN dB SNR . (a)Worst case attack against single decoder.
(b) Interleaving attack. (c) Majority attack. (d) Averaging attack.
4.5 traitors are accused without observing any decoding failure
in tests.
C. Runtime Analysis
Single decoding can be efficiently implemented to compute
more than one million scores for a code of length per
second. Its complexity is in . Selecting the most
likely guilty users can be efficiently done with the max-heap al-
gorithm. Yet, it consumes a substantial part of the runtime for
small . The runtime contribution of score computation for the
joint decoding stages is in and clearly depends on
Fig. 7. Jourdas andMoulin setup: , , ,
averaging and interleaving attack followed by AWGN (0 dB SNR. (a) Aver-
aging attack. (b) Interleaving attack.
the size of the pruned list of suspects. However, the computation
of the score per subset is independent of the subset size thanks
to the revolving door enumeration method of the subsets.5 Re-
stricting and keeps the joint decoding approach com-
putationally tractable. Better decoding performance can be ob-
tained using higher values at the cost of a substantial increase in
runtime. Experiments have shown that even the moderate set-
tings ( and ) achieve a considerable
gain of the joint over the single decoder for several collusion
channels.
Thresholding accounts for more than half of the runtime in
the experimental setups investigated in this work. However, this
is not a serious issue for applications with a large user base or
when becomes large. Thresholding depends on the subset
size because a large number of random codeword combina-
tions must be generated and because we seek lower probability
level in . Therefore, the complexity is in
according to [25]. There are no more than such itera-
tions with , so that the complexity of the thresholding is
in and the global complexity of our decoder stays
in .
More details about the runtime of our implementation are
given in [27]. Note that results have been obtained with a single
CPU core although a parallel implementation can be easily
achieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
Decoding fingerprinting codes in practice means to trace
guilty persons over a large set of users while having no infor-
mation about the size nor the strategy of the collusion. This
5In each step is updated by replacing one user’s codeword. See [27] for
details.
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must be done reliably by guaranteeing a controlled probability
of false alarm.
Our decoder implements provably good concepts of infor-
mation theory (joint decoding, side information, linear decoder
for compound channels) and statistics (estimation of extreme
quantile of a rare event). Its extension to soft output decoding
is straightforward as it does not change the architecture. Very
competitive results have been obtained experimentally.
Since the proposed iterative method is neither just a single
decoder nor completely a joint decoder (it only considers
subsets over a short list of suspects), it is rather difficult to find
the best distribution for code construction and its worst case
attack. Experiments show that the interleaving attack is indeed




is one sided w.r.t. some
and thusw.r.t. the expectation over if for at
least one of these values of . The collusion channels of this set
share the property that .
From [22, eq. (20)]
(20)
(21)
Take s.t. . We first show
that so that is a minimizer of





, with . The mutual information is
a convex function of for fixed so that, once
integrated over , we have
(24)
The second inequality turns to be an equality if only if
. It means that colluders succeed to nul-
lify the mutual information between and for any s.t.
. Then, is not a unique minimizer. This can
happen if is big enough, but it is impossible for distributions
s.t. for some , see [22, sec. 4]. This
especially holds for .
We now prove that (8) holds . This is equiva-
lent to
(25)
where the LHS is of the form with
. After developing the expressions for , we find that
(26)
The four terms inside parenthesis are not negative because
for and . Since ,
we obtain and (8) after expectation over .
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